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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOUSE

1. In view of agreements reached on 12 July, I believe that it is in order to cancel paragraph 4 on page 2 of the Interim Report of Task Team IV.
2. Reference is made also to page 21 of the Interim Report. Request that paragraph (c) on page 21 be deleted, that paragraph (d) be redesignated as (c), and that that portion of paragraph (b) at the top of page 21 be corrected to reflect agreement that operationally deployed sites be designated by place name and consecutive numbering of launch sites associated with a single place name.

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Comments on Points Raised by Mr. Paul A. Borel

1. What components in Community are most affected? What system are they now using?

COMMENT: It appears to me that the National Intelligence Surveys would be most affected. Currently the NIS identifies installations and geographic features by names. This does not constitute positive identification. The NIS should add B.E. numbers as well for positive identification. As things stand at present, the installations and geographic features in the NIS cannot be completely identified in terms of similar installations in the B.E. There would be some impact also on the Foreign Installations Branch in CIA. Some 40,000 priority installations and cities contained in, or due to be contained in, the FIB currently have or are scheduled to have B.E. numbers and the first three digits of the category code used for the B.E./TDI. I don't know how far along the FIB is in this field.

2. What actual problems have arisen as a result of non-standardization in identification of targets? At what cost?

COMMENT: Because of non-standardization in identification of targets, there have been a number of problems. There has been inadvertent duplication of intelligence collection requests. There have been coordination errors between operational commanders having war plans in areas common to two or more commands. There has been a great deal of time lost in trying to identify targets described by various non-standard coding or numbering systems. There has been confusion on the part of the top brass being briefed by one agency with its identification system and then by another agency on the same subject with its own identification system.

3. What improvements will result if we standardize? At what cost?

COMMENT: The main improvements which would result from standardization are as follows:

a. Facilitation of assembly of all intelligence, regardless of source, bearing on any installation or geographic feature.

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- b. Increase in value of the National Intelligence Surveys to the intelligence and operational planners through enforcement of a greater degree of specificity.
- c. Elimination, to the greatest possible extent, of inadvertent duplication of intelligence collection requests.
- d. Provision of means for computer-to-computer conversations to the greatest possible extent.
- e. Reduction in coordination errors between operational commanders having war plans in areas common to two or more commands.
- f. Facilitation of telephonic coordination among Washington Community and other intelligence agencies with respect to installations and geographic features of intelligence interest.
- g. Reduction of time lost, under emergency conditions, of having to cope with several means of installation or target identification, with consequent increase in time for analysis and preparation of recommendations.
- h. Elimination of unwarranted "competition" among rival agencies, each advocating the system peculiar to each such agency.
- i. Elimination of confusion on the part of the "top brass" being briefed by one agency with its identification system and then being briefed on the same subject, by another agency, with its identification system.

It is not possible to estimate the costs which would be involved through standardization for enhancement of the operational capabilities of the Intelligence Community.

4. Is application to be all-source? If so, how have security implications been resolved?

COMMENT: Yes, all-source. Adequate provisions have been made for sanitization of all-source intelligence.

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5. Emphasis has been on identification of installations as targets. Have other interests (e.g., an installation as a source of positive intelligence) been adequately protected?


COMMENT: The Interim Report emphasizes installations and geographic features of intelligence interest rather than the identification of installations as targets. A functional code and other identification factors have equal applicability to all types of installations.

6. Clarification of where responsibility would reside for maintaining and updating the code.

COMMENT: Responsibility for maintenance and updating of the functional or category code rests with the Defense Intelligence Agency, which discharges this responsibility in close collaboration with the operational commands concerned. DIA will always appreciate constructive comments or suggestions for improvement or further required refinement for the code in question.

7. Implications of reducing reliance on ISC.

COMMENT: The Interim Report implies no reduction in reliance upon the Intelligence Subject Code.



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